Category Archives: Research

On “the International Criminal Court and National Courts: A Contentious Relationship” : A Book Review

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Submitted to Professor M. Masaeli
for the course Special Research Topics: Global Justice
University of Ottawa, July 22, 2012

In his book The International Criminal Court and National Courts: A Contentious Relationship, Nidal Nabil Jurdi uses a deeply comprehensive historical and legal analysis to answer his question of whether the International Criminal Court (ICC) is effective at encouraging national judicial systems to prosecute core crimes in the effort to eradicate impunity in the international criminal system. What Jurdi refers to as a “hope that the ICC would change the dynamics of international relations, creating a global body that transcends state interests to enforce an erga omnes duty to prosecute international crimes” he says, “has not yet been realized” (Jurdi, 2011, p. 263). In his historical recounting of the negotiations surrounding the creation of the ICC and complementarity principle, Jurdi builds his conviction that the “complementarity mechanism” (as he puts it) has been unsuccessful at encouraging states to take up their duty under the Rome Statute to prosecute core crimes, and thus the ICC and states together have not been able to eradicate impunity (p. 6). Jurdi draws on a thorough and complete inspection of the Rome Statute as well as case studies from Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sudan to follow the reader through his conclusions. Although Jurdi’s detailed historical and legal analysis of the complementarity principle (both in abstract and in practice) effectively draw out the ICC’s weaknesses and strengths, the book lacks developed or original suggestions. While I agree on Jurdi’s central conclusion on the ineffectiveness of past co-operations between national judicial systems and the ICC, I differ on the solutions I call upon in response. Where Jurdi advocates for greater support for the ICC both at the international and domestic level, I suggest that the improvement of national judicial systems themselves require the focused energy and support of the international community.

To illustrate, this review will articulate the particular realities that Jurdi reveals as significant and deeply concerning complications for the effectiveness of the complementarity mechanism. These realities include the implications of: (1) state cooperation (illustrated by the Darfur case);  (2) pardons; and (3) a positive interpretation of complementarity (to be elaborated later) as critical barriers toward the effectiveness of complementarity. While Jurdi uses these weaknesses and loopholes in the complementarity principle to strengthen his call for greater support for the ICC, this review will highlight his arguments from a different light, viewing the issue instead from the bottom (domestic to international), as opposed to the top (international to domestic) perspective, the latter of which Jurdi employs throughout the book. The author’s work in this light will reveal that while he aims to end impunity, his suggestions do so only short-sightedly. Rather, the focus of his perspective remains focused on unsustainable solutions for cooperation to improve the effectiveness of the ICC on a case-by-case basis. The aim of this review of Jurdi’s book, hopes to make clear that impunity could be more sustainably combated by greater effort towards improving the national judicial systems themselves.

To begin, it is noteworthy that Jurdi approaches these issues as a lecturer on the subject of international law and organizations at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon. In the past, Jurdi has been Human Rights Officer at the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and is widely published in this and other areas including terrorism and Lebanese law (Jurdi, 2011, p. xxvii). Deeply entrenched in the international criminal law system from the top, it is reasonable and perhaps justified that his aim in the book is to inform and help to solve the issue of impunity on a short term, or case-by-case, basis.

(1) State cooperation

The author’s deep legal analyses of Article 17, Article 20, and Article 53 of the Rome Statute reveal how the complementarity mechanism in its careful choice of terms, notes and criteria is deeply rooted in the principle of state sovereignty as a result of the process of negotiations and compromise by the drafters. With this insight in mind, it is almost with humour that Jurdi the notes the following, referencing the ‘unwillingness’ criterion with respect to admissibility, in the Darfur case: “it is a deep paradox for the ICC, whose jurisdiction is triggered by the lack of action or unwillingness of Sudan [to prosecute core crimes], to rely heavily on the support of Sudan to carry out its mandate” (as cited in Jurdi, 2011, p. 258). Here, the author refers to the political and practical challenges that the ICC faces in attempting to conduct proceedings against Ahmad Harun, Ali Kushayb and Omar al-Bashir, which ultimately prevented the ICC from conducting investigations inside Sudan (as cited in Jurdi, 2011, pp. 253-5). While this is a unsettling setback, the complexities regarding state cooperation dig further, since in light of the Security Council, we see that:  Continue reading →

Market Overview: Telecommunications in the Middle East

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Submitted to Professor Kathleen Day
University of Ottawa, May 11, 2012

In the Middle East, overall demand for information and communications technology (ICT) has grown rapidly since 2006. Significant increases in subscriptions to mobile services comprise the bulk of this growth, followed by mobile internet and wired internet. By contrast, fixed-line telephone subscriptions have experienced slow decline across the region, particularly since 2007. This overall upward trend is accompanied by increasing demands for data at high download speeds. Growing volumes of data traffic challenge the current 2G and 3G infrastructures in the region,[1] compromising the quality of service that operators are able to offer when traffic volume is steeply higher than average. Consequently, prices related to telecommunications services have declined in the region. The ITU uses a price basket comprising of prices for fixed-telephone, mobile, and internet services taken as a percentage of average income levels.[2]This method to compare price levels from year-to-year in Middle Eastern countries shows that ICT price levels have dropped overall since 2008 (see Table 1).

Table 1 Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen have experienced declines in overall ICT prices (as a percentage of GNI per capita). Source: ITU (2012). [3]

In response to these trends, public institutions and private operators are investing significantly into improved infrastructure. Larger countries in terms of GNI per capita, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have invested in rolling out 4G LTE mobile networks to be completed within the next 5 years. Less developed countries have invested in improving upon existing 2G and 3G networks. National regulatory institutions have also taken long term measures to respond to expected growth in data traffic volume and subscribers. National regulatory bodies in many countries have deconstructed former monopolies in the past decade (examples include Etisalat in UAE and Qtel in Qatar), giving mobile and internet operating licenses to new entrants (du in UAE and Vodafone in Qatar). [4]

Industry Overview – Segmentation, Products and Services

Non-traditional mobile- and internet-based products and services are adopted increasingly in the region as total numbers of subscribers grows. Services like Mobile TV and IPTV gain ground in the market as consumers seek additional value-added services to complement their existing subscriptions. Other products, such as mobile banking, have seen less encouraging uptake as they enter the market. Industry analysts have speculated that conducting financial activities on mobile platforms is not culturally intuitive for consumers in the Middle East, giving reason for mobile banking’s failure to penetrate the regional market despite eager adoptions of other non-essential mobile services.[5]

Competitive Environment and Company Profiles

Some monopolies and duopolies still exist in the region, particularly in countries experiencing less growth in data demands and lower average income levels (such as Lebanon and Yemen). Some former monopoly markets, such as UAE and Qatar, have introduced new entrants in the latter part of the past decade. Due to the recent implementation of these changes in the competitive environment, most countries in the region have a very powerful incumbent.[6] Other more poorly regulated markets, notably Iraq’s market for internet, have a highly competitive atmosphere with as many as 16 licensed competitors.[7]

Research Conclusions for Satellite

The significance of these trends and developments in telecommunications in the Middle East for satellite operators is notable. Mobile and internet operators face the challenge of maintaining quality services while simultaneously upgrading their networks to cope with current and projected levels of data traffic volume. These telecommunications companies turn to satellite backhaul services in order to ensure that end consumers still receive network services when existing terrestrial networks are exceedingly stressed. How subscriber growth continues in the Middle East over the next decade will be of particular importance to satellite operators. Continued strong growth in both data demands and subscribers in the region will ensure that network operators continue to need satellite backhaul services. On the other hand, the stability of strong growth in ICT services in the Middle East is not certain. Already, more developed countries are closely nearing mobile and internet saturation levels (such as Bahrain and Oman),[8]meaning that in the future, revenue growth will not be driven solely by nominal growth in subscribers, but also by non-essential mobile and internet services (such as mobile banking, mobile TV and IPTV). Looking ahead, how satellite operators package their services in the Middle East telecommunications industry in the coming decade will be of increasing importance. As satellite aims to play a key role in providing the region with opportunities for growth and more efficient access to information and communications technologies, planning for strategic partnerships and offerings for this region will be critical in the years to come. Continue reading →

Telecommunications and International Development

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Submitted to Professor Kathleen Day
University of Ottawa, May 11, 2012

Despite having the technological capability to bring most of the world’s population online, there remain technological, regulatory, financial and political barriers. Data published in the Millennium Development Goals Report 2011 show evidence of these challenges. Figure 2 (below) shows that internet penetration has remained low in LDCs compared to growth in developed and developing regions since 1998.[1] Thus, regardless of the ability of satellite and other new technologies to connect unconnected populations in LDCs, persistent low internet penetration suggests that other barriers exist.

Figure 2 Source: United Nations, 2011.

In developing and least developed regions despite regulatory and financial barriers to connectivity, internet and mobile subscriber growth is nonetheless accompanied by increasing volumes of data traffic. The challenges of this growth for telecommunications companies in the Middle East have already been discussed in terms of infrastructure in the previous section of this report. For developing and least developed countries, subscriber growth (and subsequently growth in connectivity) is limited due to the often poor and underdeveloped state of terrestrial communications infrastructure.[2] In anticipation of these limits, wealthier countries in the Middle East have begun updating existing networks to accommodate future increases in data traffic. However, technologies are not suitable for all regions equally. How these technologies work is thus important to a discussion of expanding connected populations. In the case study to follow, the technical capabilities of two competing forms of internet and mobile networks (WiMAX and LTE) is discussed with consideration for their uses in the developing world.

CASE STUDY: WIMAX VERSUS LTE TECHNOLOGY

WiMAX and LTE are 4G technology standards that compete to provide end consumers with an alternative technology through which they can consume data abundantly at high download speeds. These are among the handful of technologies that telecommunications companies rely on to serve customers. There are a few key differences between WiMAX and LTE, which make their capabilities and suitability vary by region and circumstance. WiMAX is a fixed-line internet technology. Working much like a modem does, WiMAX can provide internet services over a radius of many kilometres from a telecommunications tower. For instance, it can provide internet access to a city or region like a hotspot does for a city block.[3]

LTE, on the other hand, is a mobile technology, able to provide internet, data and voice services like a cellular network, with higher bandwidth capabilities than WiMAX. The offering of LTE versus WiMAX is comparable in that they both provide similar download speeds for small populations. LTE, however, is able to handle much higher traffic volume, and thus has much more capacity per user than WiMAX.[4]

The cost associated with these technologies differs vastly. WiMAX is significantly more cost-effective to roll-out then LTE in areas with low population density. Consequently, WiMAX technology is found more frequently in less developed regions with low investment capabilities and limited infrastructure, such as rural parts of Africa and Asia.[5] LTE, however, is under development in emerging economies where there is greater fiscal capacity to invest and higher-density areas. Wealthier countries in the Middle East region, such as Saudi Arabia and UAE, have invested in implementing LTE in order to cope with their projected data demands within the next decade.[6]

These differences between WiMAX and LTE point to a gap in development strategies for the developing world in terms of telecommunications. Although current technological capabilities can feasibly bring connectivity to the populations of developing and least developed countries via tailored solutions such as WiMAX and LTE, other barriers prevent telecommunications from expanding into these markets. The findings concerning the industry in the Middle East suggest that lack of investment is the most significant issue. Certainly for countries experiencing growth in traffic volume and challenges in infrastructure, attracting investment to update existing terrestrial infrastructure is critical. LDCs on the other hand are limited in that growth in telecommunications is low and investment is consequently scarce. In these cases, it is important that other development goals such as improved overall health and education are addressed in order to create an economic, political and social environment that fosters business growth.

There are also technological barriers that are less evident than the macroeconomic issues described above. Satellite, for example, faces challenges in telecommunications in developing and emerging markets. Although WiMAX with lower capacity to handle high amounts of traffic would rely more on satellite backhaul to ensure uninterrupted services, it also risks interfering with particular satellite frequencies.[7] Conflicting technical solutions pose significant issues for developing regions. As WiMAX and satellite are both viable ways to connect rural and remote regions with risk of interference, critical decisions concerning which technologies to invest in are left with national regulatory bodies. This web of issues and solutions thus involves diverse areas of expertise. The discussion here touches on only some, including technology, policy, politics and economics. The complexity of providing connectivity to the unconnected quickly becomes clear.

Nevertheless, the fiscal strength of the satellite industry in particular suggests that satellite remains a strong solution for broad-based global connectivity. As satellite is technologically capable of connecting 99% of the world’s population, it is reliant on progress in the remaining development goals to create the strong economic, social and political environment needed to spur demand and growth in the telecommunications markets of the developing world. Continue reading →

Peacekeeping and Sexual Exploitation: Exploring the Challenges to Eradicating United Nations Affiliation with Sexual Exploitation

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Submitted to Professor Nailya Okda
for the course Humanitarian Intervention
University of Ottawa, December 15, 2011

Introduction

In United Nations (UN) missions around the world, there have been proven allegations of UN peacekeepers participating in illicit behaviour of sexual exploitation. These allegations made against peacekeepers concern acts of gender-based crimes, committed during missions in post- conflict areas including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Liberia, Haiti, East Timor and Cambodia. These occurrences ultimately comprise a larger issue of moral consequence, health hazard and aid effectiveness, jeopardizing the legitimacy and purpose of UN peacekeeping operations. The implications of these illicit actions are not only significant for recipient countries, but also for sending countries, having such wide-ranging consequences including the spread of AIDS, and increasing questionable accountability within the UN. Although discussion of this issue is limited in comparison with larger issues in the realm of humanitarian intervention, there have been suggestions by academics and major political actors alike in order to suppress the issue of sexual exploitation carried out by UN peacekeepers. In a discussion of the implications for morality, health, and aid effectiveness, the suggestions put forward will also be evaluated in terms of the challenges they face. In essence, it will be proven that there still remains significant institutional and political challenges to eradicating the sexual exploits of UN peacekeeping operations, and that significant political will and action is needed on the part of UN members and sending countries in order to change the discourse of ignorance and compliance in the sexual misconducts of UN peacekeeping missions and forces.

 Background

The seriousness of cases of sexual exploitation conducted by UN troops are best articulated in the severity of recorded instances. In an article analyzing the potential for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute offending peacekeepers, Melanie O’Brien describes a few cases of occurred sexual exploitation in detail, as quoted below:

… the circumstances of the case of Ronghi, in which a US soldier engaged as part of the American peacekeeping contingent in Kosovo raped and murdered a 10 year old girl.

Discussing in more detail this same case, O’Brien says further:

… the elements of force (the violence used in subduing his victim) and taking advantage of a coercive environment (exploiting the trust his victim had in him by luring her to an empty basement) exist.

Another case, this time in Moldova, describes instances where the severity may go so far as to be characterized as sexual slavery:

… such as the purchase of a Moldovan woman by an American in Bosnia, who kept the woman in a house with her passport confiscated and forced her to engage in sexual acts.

In an article entitled Other Face of UN in Cambodia, which appeared in Economic and Political Weekly on November 21st, 1992, during the occupation of the United Nations Transitional Authority on Cambodia (UNTAC), an anonymous correspondent points to a dramatic increase in prostitution in the country since the arrival of UNTAC. The author cites the complaints and allegations made by several non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who have identified UN soldiers going to brothels in UN official cars and uniforms. More importantly, the author alludes to three overarching consequences of this behaviour, which are described in greater detail below.  Continue reading →

Policy Suggestions for the Informal Economy in Latin America

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Submitted to Professor A. Alvarez-Jimenez
for the course Development Issues in Latin America
University of Ottawa, December 9, 2011

The academic discussion of the informal economy in Latin America can be divided into two central tendencies. The first is a general consensus that one of the causes of the informal economy is a lack of enforcement of rules and regulation. The second is the general finding that fiscal policies have contributed to poor macroeconomic performance and thus to the growth of informality (Freije, 2002). In looking at both of these causes, it can be seen that growth of the informal economy is a combination of phenomena that increases both the incentives and the desperation to work informally. As the need for high-skilled labour, capital intensity, labour supply and excessive regulations on labour increase, so do the incidences of informality. On the other hand, lack of enforcement of land use enables informal activities to take place. The discussion, however, is more complex in that there is no consensus as to the nature of growth in the informal economy, and thus no agreed policies in what should be done to decrease its size. Continue reading →

Gold Prices and Short-term Nominal Interest Rates: An Examination of Potential Influences on Gold Prices

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Written by G. Godsell & V. Tran
Submitted to Professor Kathleen Day
for the course Introduction to Econometrics
University of Ottawa, December 6, 2011

Introduction

In light of major events in the United States’ economy since mid-2007 and the related behaviors of interest rates, commodity prices, unemployment and national debt, we will determine in this paper the nature of the relationship between these variables and their potential implications for future fiscal policy. Using a regression analysis of gold prices, we will gain a clearer understanding of how gold’s price behaviour can be explained. We expect that our regression analysis will confirm our hypothesis that fiscal policies attempting to stimulate investment and growth by lowering nominal interest rates may contribute significantly to asset bubbles through their effect on commodity prices, such as gold. Our analysis of gold prices from the past 41 years (1970-2010) will test our opinion by demonstrating how commodity prices in general have been impacted by changes in the interest rate.

Our hypothesis attempts to identify the impact that manipulating interest rates can have on the economy. In the short term, they can provide some stimulus to the economy by lowering borrowing costs. This incentive often encourages businesses and consumers to make additional purchases of capital goods and make other significant investments, such as property or equipment renovations. Once the purchaser spends the money, there is usually a stimulating effect on the economy, as people must be hired to build the good or provide the service.

It is also our belief that low interest rate policies may also create inflationary pressure. This is because the total cost in dollars for something that can be bought at a lower interest rate can be much less than the same item when interest rates are high. Oftentimes this may be the difference between being able to afford an item, such as a car, or not afford the item. If the cost of money (interest) remains low for an extended period of time, then it is possible for consumers to bid up the prices for these goods and services.

It is our belief that as interest rates decrease and, consequently, the cost of money decreases, the more people are able to purchase fixed assets such as gold. In other words, gold price is driven upwards as there is less opportunity cost associated with buying gold when interest rates are low. During periods of low interest rates, owning an asset that does not directly provide a revenue stream (i.e. dividends or bond yields) may be less problematic. If more people can afford the higher price, then there is usually some corresponding inflationary pressure. We expect that this inflationary pressure will be reflected in our analysis of gold prices against other variables.

Mathematical Representation of the Regression Equation

The regression equation we use in our initial analysis is specified as follows:

The latter sections of this paper will also discuss an alternate regression equation, which is a necessary re-specification of the above in response to poor initial regression results. Discussing this latter equation in tandem with the initial model is useful to compare our expectations of the additional coefficients, as well as to define the added variables early on. Later, we will see that this allows us to examine both regression results in clearer and greater depth. As we will illustrate later, the alternate equation performs far better in its explanatory power and interpretation. The latter equation includes gold production and additional macroeconomic measures that may influence gold demand. Thus, references to Equation 1 in the rest of the paper will now refer to the equation above. References to Equation 2 will then refer to the following model specification:

Where the definitions of GOLDt, INTRt, MONt, RSCNt, DEBTt, LGPRODt, and EMPRt are:

Continue reading →

Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur: Analysis and Recommendations

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Written in collaboration with M. Mzee. Edited by A. Flynn and R. Al-Katta.
Submitted to Professor N. Okda, University of Ottawa, Fall 2011.

The international community’s actions for humanitarian intervention in Darfur were evident failures on multiple fronts. From the violations of peace agreements to the early inaction of external actors, these events that comprise the ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Darfur represent a disconcerting reality; that in the face of conflict, positive outcomes are more a question of political will and decisiveness than the urgency of humanitarian crises. Concerning Darfur, the efforts to peacefully resolve the conflict failed on several principles.

Justification for the Non-use of Force

Most notable in the series of intervention efforts is the Western states’ reliance on peace talks for conflict resolution. Each subsequent agreement, however, failed with both warring parties in violation of agreed terms. In 2007, after several failed attempts at negotiated peace, the U.S. imposed economic sanctions on government-owned Sudanese companies in an attempt to persuade the government to make and enforce sustainable peace (Darfur Consortium, 2009). The violence in Darfur has nonetheless continued.

The initial international reaction to Darfur was characterized by three contradictory trends, reflecting the competing values outlined earlier. First, there was inarguable consensus on the part of Western journalists, human rights organizations, and some states of an international responsibility to protect the people of Darfur. Second, there were significant doubts about how (primary, secondary, tertiary, etc.) responsibility should be allocated in practice, particularly considering what roles the Government of Sudan, AU and UN should assume. However, what was clear, was that key Western states were deeply reluctant to assume responsibility, if it meant acting against the wishes of the Sudanese government. Third, many states expressed their discontent at any potential violation of Sudanese sovereignty.

These trends and lack of success raise the question of whether the use of force should have been used by the international community. In accordance with the UN Charter, force is justified as a last resort, where it is very likely to bring about a positive outcome and where all other non-force attempts at peace have failed (United Nations [UN], Article 42, para. 1). In spite of the failure of every non-force attempt at peace since 2003, forceful intervention would still not be justified. Given the level of mistrust that each warring party holds against the other and against the international community, external actors using forced intervention could potentially jeopardize any residing trust between the warring parties and external actors. This risk is no clearer than in President al-Bashir’s response to UN Resolution 1706, calling it, “part of comprehensive conspiracy for confiscating the country’s sovereignty,” (Darfur Consortium, 2009).

Forced intervention in the Darfur conflict is not justified on several other principles. To start, the continued attempts at peace agreements demonstrate that the warring parties have remained willing to agree to peace through negotiation. To use military intervention would breach the justification of force as a last resort. As well, it is unlikely that forced intervention would bring about a positive outcome. Drawing from the experiences of past military interventions in international conflict, the use of force introduces overwhelming post-conflict challenges that non-force intervention could avoid. Though external actors may argue that forceful intervention could prevent further devastation, there is little evidence that external military force, in the past, has achieved this within the Darfur region.

It could also be argued that military intervention is justified by the Sudanese government’s failing responsibility to protect its citizens. Despite the government’s failure, however, it remains willing to agree to peace. The potential for peaceful resolution is most notably demonstrated by South Sudan’s recently achieved independence on July 9th, 2011, bringing an end to the decades-long civil war between North and South Sudan (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] News, 2011; Deng, 2001).

These justifications for the non-use of force, however, do not address the long-standing issue of why attempted agreements at peace in the Darfur case have consistently failed. Further analysis will reveal that the initial inaction on the part of the international community and mistrust between the warring parties has contributed to the ongoing Darfur conflict.

Why did the Peace Talks Fail?

The timeline of attempted peace agreements since 2003 reveal two recurring factors that contributed to each agreement’s failure. The first of these factors was the refusal of involved parties to participate in the negotiations, or their rejection of proposed peace treaties. The Peace Accord of May 2006, UN Resolution 1706 and the peace talks of February 2007 are just some examples where warring parties have either rejected the agreements or neglected to participate (Darfur Consortium, 2009). The second factor – related to the first – is the consistent, rigid mistrust between the conflicted parties. Frequently, each actor has accused the others of violating ceasefires and disrespecting agreed terms. Neither the government, nor the rebel groups have trusted that the other would respect the terms of the agreements or the demands of the opposing parties. Ultimately, this unrelenting mistrust has encouraged the government and rebels to resort to alternative means of persuasion and coercion, largely resulting in continued violence and tension in Darfur.

Recommendations

Improving legitimacy and trust amongst the warring parties could help facilitate greater success in future peace talks. In the initial year of the Darfur conflict, the immediate participation of the UN as a mediator may have improved adherence to the early peace agreements. The UN’s inaction and the arguably biased involvement of Chadian President Idriss Deby, contributed to the early onset of mistrust between the warring parties. The presence of an impartial mediator early on in the peace process could have aided the government and rebels to trust that peace agreements would be respected. Though this early reaction and responsibility as an impartial mediator is reflected in the official UN documents (“UN Security Council: Functions and Powers,” n.d.), the UN nevertheless failed to make action on these responsibilities a reality.

The separation of South Sudan from the North also represents an opportunity for economic sanctions to provide greater incentive for further peace negotiations. With most of Sudan’s oil reserves now located in the independent South (Copnall, 2011), North Sudan’s economic vulnerability reduce its ability to bargain in the midst of greater sanctions. South Sudan thus has significant potential to bring about an end to the Darfur conflict, depending on the terms of trade it agrees to with its Northern counterpart. Whether South Sudan has the ability to manage its own internal conflicts as a newly independent state and the economic power to influence affairs in the North is still uncertain.

Current Situation

Conflict and tension between Darfur and Khartoum continues to this day. Peace talks have failed to resolve the conflict, though statements from the Sudanese government in October 2011 indicate that it is willing to end the conflict with the rebels if all parties sign the Doha agreement without further negotiation. The rebel groups have not agreed to these conditions and continue to demand further discussion (Sudan Tribune, “Sudan ‘ready for peace’ with Darfur rebels,” 2011).

The recently gained independence of South Sudan has given hope to the rebel groups pushing for greater influence in the North. JEM’s external relations secretary, Ahmed Hussein Adam, has stated that the Khartoum government holds responsibility for negotiating acceptable terms for unity in North Sudan. He  stresses that a lesson should be learned from South Sudan’s independence in order to prevent greater demands for its own independence (Sudan Tribune, “Darfur rebels welcome South Sudan independence,” 2011). Whether further negotiation on the rebel’s terms and a representative acceptance of the Doha Peace Agreement will materialize is still questionable.

References

BBC News. (2011). Sudan Profile. Retrieved November 6, 2011 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14095300

Copnall, J. (2011). How will southern independence affect Sudan? Retrieved November 6, 2011 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14019051

Darfur Consortium. (2009). A timeline of the Darfur Crisis and the response of the international community. Retrieved November 6, 2011 from http://www.darfurconsortium.org/darfur_crisis/timeline.html

Deng, F. (2001). Sudan – Civil War and Genocide. The Middle East Quarterly. Retrieved November 7, 2011 from http://www.meforum.org/22/sudan-civil-war-and-genocide

Sudan Tribune. (2011). Sudan ‘ready for peace’ with Darfur rebels. Retrieved November 7, 2011 from http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-says-ready-for-peace-with,40498

Sudan Tribune. (2011). Darfur rebels welcome South Sudan independence, hope Khartoum understands the lesson. Retrieved November 6, 2011 from http://www.sudantribune.com/Darfur-rebels-welcome-South-Sudan,39495

United Nations. Chapter VII: Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of Agression. Retrieved November 7, 2011 from http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml

United Nations. UN Security Council: Functions and Powers. Retrieved November 3, 2011 from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_functions.html